Does Donald Trump’s ascent to power in the US mark an end to the influence of Davos Man? This is a term invented by Samuel Huntington, the late political scientist, himself a participant at the annual meetings of the World Economic Forum in Davos, for a class of people he despised.
唐纳德·特朗普(Donald Trump)在美国掌权，是否标志着“达沃斯人”(Davos Man)的影响力不行了？“达沃斯人”这个词语是已故政治学家塞缪尔?亨廷顿(Samuel Huntington)创造出来的，用来形容他所鄙视的一群人。亨廷顿生前也出席在达沃斯举行的世界经济论坛(World Economic Forum at Davos)年度会议。He argued that they “have little need for national loyalty, view national boundaries as obstacles that thankfully are vanishing and see national governments as residues from the past whose only useful function is to facilitate the elite’s global operations”.
亨廷顿认为，这些人“基本不需要国家忠诚这种东西，把国家边界视为万幸正在逐渐消失的障碍，把国家政府视为历史残余，唯一有用的职能是为精英的全球活动提供便利”。So are we about to witness a decisive shift away from the aspirations of the WEF’s members and, if so, is this desirable? The answers are “yes” and “no”.
那么，我们现在将看到形势明确朝着与“达沃斯人”愿望相反的方向发展吗？如果是的话，这种变化是人们想要的吗？答案既肯定又否定。
Core beliefs of the Davos creed have been global co-operation and economic globalisation. But faith in the latter was shaken after the global financial crisis of 2007-09. The ratio of trade to global economic output has stagnated since then, after doubling between the early 1970s and 2007. The stock of foreign direct investment continues to rise relative to world output, albeit slowly. But the stock of cross-border financial assets has declined outright.
“达沃斯派”的核心信念是全球合作与经济全球化。2007-2009年的全球金融危机之后，人们对后者的信念发生了动摇。上世纪70年代初至2007年期间，全球贸易与全球经济产出的比例上升了一倍，但此后停滞不前。外国直接投资(FDI)存量相对于全球产出的比例继续升高，只是增速缓慢。至于跨境金融资产存量就完全是下滑了。This weakening of globalisation partly reflects the exhaustion of easy opportunities for global commerce and the feeble growth of demand since the crisis. But it also reflects shifts in policy: the post-crisis re-regulation of finance has had a pronounced home bias, with reduced support for cross-border activities. Trade liberalisation has stalled, while some studies already show a rise in protectionist measures.
这种全球化走下坡路的趋势，部分反映了全球商业领域中唾手可得的机会已经没有了，同时需求增长乏力。但这种趋势也反映了政策的变化：危机后重新加强金融监管具有明显的本土偏向，对跨境活动的支持减少了。贸易自由化停滞，同时一些研究表明保护主义措施增加。Mr Trump’s inauguration as US president this week presages a marked tightening of the protectionist screws. The Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiated under his predecessor Barack Obama seems dead. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership is stillborn. More important, Mr Trump threatens to focus on bilateral deals, impose tariffs on imports from important partners, notably China and Mexico, and treat the World Trade Organisation with contempt. This approach could take us back to the kind of global trade-policy chaos that occurred between the first and second world wars.
本周特朗普就任美国总统预示着保护主义声势将明显大涨。其前任巴拉克?奥巴马(Barack Obama)主政下谈成的《跨太平洋伙伴关系协定》(TPP)似乎死掉了。《跨大西洋贸易与投资伙伴关系协定》(TTIP)也是胎死腹中。更重要的是，特朗普威胁要把重点放在双边协议上，扬言对来自重要贸易伙伴——主要是中国和墨西哥——的进口商品征收关税，并藐视世界贸易组织(WTO)。这些做法可能会把我们带回到两次世界大战之间那种全球贸易政策混乱的状态。At the same time, strangely, Mr Trump seems set on abolishing many of the regulations imposed on finance after the crisis. So Davos people could still take whatever financial risks they wanted but could no longer trade as freely in goods and services. Finding a rationale for this is impossible. It is a reflection of the intellectual incoherence characteristic of populism.
另一方面，奇怪的是，特朗普似乎决心废除在危机之后实施的许多金融监管规定。因此，“达沃斯人”仍然可以在金融领域想怎么冒险就怎么冒险，但再也不能与之前同样自由地交易商品和服务了。想找出这些做法的理论依据是不可能的。这反映出了民粹主义在思想方面缺乏连贯性的特点。Yet make no mistake: Mr Trump could bring down the temple of world trade. If he were to impose punitive (and unjustifiable) tariffs on Chinese imports, the EU is likely to follow suit in order to protect its producers from a surge of Chinese imports. China would then feel obliged to retaliate. The system of trade rules could collapse.
不过，千真万确：特朗普可能会推倒世界贸易的神殿。如果他对中国进口产品强制征收惩罚性的（和无正当理由的）关税，那么在面对大量涌来的中国进口产品，欧盟(EU)为保护本国生产商可能会仿效美国。接着，中国就会觉得必须进行报复。贸易规则体系可能会就此崩溃。So, too, could the very idea of a co-operative global system. Trade could be just one aspect of a bigger shift. If the US administration adopts the mindset of Vladimir Putin’s Russia — inward looking, narrowly self-interested and indifferent to moral norms in international relations — even a minimally co-operative global system could disappear.
合作性全球体系的概念也可能随之崩溃。贸易可能只是更宏大变化趋势中的一个方面。如果美国政府采纳了弗拉基米尔?普京(Vladimir Putin)治下俄罗斯的思维方式——向内看、狭隘地只关注自身利益和对国际关系中的道义准则漠不关心——那么就连最低限度合作的全球体系也没有立身之地。This would be the end of the Pax Americana — the period of US hegemony since the end of the second world war. The world will not easily or quickly find a replacement for the US, particularly when similar populist and protectionist forces are at work elsewhere, notably Europe. Much of the work that countries still need to do together — tackling climate change or challenges of economic development — would become impossible.
这可能导致“美国治下的和平”(Pax Americana)——指二战结束以来的美国全球霸权时期——的终结。世界将不会轻易或很快找到替代美国的角色，尤其是当其他地区、尤其是欧洲的类似民粹和保护主义势力正得势的情况下。各国仍需合作完成的大部分任务——应对气候变化或经济发展中的挑战——将不可能完成。This, then, could also be the end of a world managed for — and often by — Davos man and woman. Many will feel that might be no bad thing. But they should be careful what they wish for.
接着，这也可能导致顺应“达沃斯男”与“达沃斯女”理念进行管理、也常常由他们管理的世界走向终结。很多人会觉得那或许不是坏事。但他们应该当心自己的愿望成为现实。As has happened so often before, hubris led to over-reach. Davos people underplayed the role of legitimate and potent states in underpinning the global system. They forgot the need for the successful to recognise their responsibilities to the societies that had made their success possible. They ignored, above all, the obligation to share the gains of globalisation with its losers. The enthusiasm with which many of them seized opportunities to avoid paying taxes was disgraceful.
正如以往经常发生的那样，狂妄自大会让人失了分寸。“达沃斯人”忽视了合法的、强有力的政府在支持全球体系方面的作用。他们忘了，成功人士有必要承担起他们对社会的责任，正是社会让他们的成功成为可能。特别是，他们忽视了应当与输家分享全球化成果的责任。他们中许多人孜孜以求的是抓住一切机会避免纳税，这是可耻的。Some of the projects of the age of global economic liberalisation also went too far — notably heedless financial liberalisation, the imprudent expansion of the eurozone and encouragement of large-scale immigration. Citizenship might not matter that much to many Davos people, but it matters very much to many of their fellow citizens.
全球经济自由化时代在一些方面也走得太远——尤其是冒失的金融自由化、欧元区的鲁莽扩张和对大规模移民的鼓励。公民身份对许多“达沃斯人”或许并不重要，但对他们的很多国人来说非常重要。These mistakes, however, are not nearly as bad as those likely to be made by the new populists. Davos people are in business: they do not wield the instruments of mass coercion, but rather seek to engage in mutually enriching commercial transactions and believe in the desirability of a peaceful and essentially co-operative world. Elites far more brutal, stupid and damaging than this can all too easily be imagined.
然而，这些错误不会像新崛起的民粹主义者们可能犯下的错误那么严重。“达沃斯人”身在商界：他们不会使用政治强制工具，而是寻求开展互利的商业交易，并相信和平与大体合作的世界是值得期望的。一个残酷及愚蠢程度和破坏性远甚于此的精英阶层是完全可以想象的。The populist reaction might have become inevitable. But it will not lead to a better world, even for those who support it. Yes, policymakers should have paid more attention to what was happening to ordinary citizens, but the simple-minded populism now on the rise will soon prove far worse than the hubris of the Davos elite.
民粹主义的反应或许已是不可避免。但它不会通往一个更好的世界，甚至对于民粹主义支持者而言也是如此。是的，政策制定者们本应对普通民众的境遇给予更多关注，但如今势头上升的思想简单的民粹主义，不久之后就将被证明比达沃斯精英的狂妄自大要糟糕得多。