The growth of China's shadow banking system (with estimated outstanding credits equaling roughly 10-15% of the balance sheet of the formal banking sector) has long been flagged as a source of risk in China's financial sector. Chinese policy-makers are fully aware of the risky activities within this sector but have opted to do nothing because the system serves several useful functions and has powerful interest groups. Local governments, real estate developers, and private entrepreneurs unable to obtain loans from the state-owned formal banking sector can tap this system for funding by paying a higher interest rate. State-owned banks and investment companies pocket lucrative transaction fees by peddling wealth management products (WMPs) issued by borrowers to depositors chasing high yields. When this game is going well, a lot of rich and powerful people make money while risk builds up in the financial sector.
很长一段时间以来，人们一直把中国影子银行体系的扩张（据估算，这个体系的信贷余额约等于正规银行业资产负债规模的10-15%）视为中国金融行业的风险源头。中国的决策者完全清楚这个领域的风险活动，但一直选择按兵不动，原因是影子银行有多种有利用途，也有着强大的利益团体。无法从正规国有银行得到贷款的地方政府、房地产开发商和私营企业主能以更高的利率为代价从影子银行获得资金。而国有银行和投资公司将借款人发行的理财产品兜售给追逐高收益的储户，进而获得可观的交易费。在一切进展顺利的情况下，许多有钱有势的人赚了钱，金融行业的风险则不断积累。
As with similar instances of financial recklessness, confidence can evaporate quickly, setting off a panicked exit from the market. Even sophisticated and capable regulators are often ill-prepared for such unforeseen and highly disruptive events. If we analyze the recent gyrations in China's interbank loan market from this perspective, we may gain a better understanding of the causes behind the short-lived panic and avoid overreacting to or over-interpreting this event.
和金融领域类似的冒进事件一样，信心会瞬间化为乌有，人们会慌忙逃离市场。面对这种预料之外而又有很大破坏性的局面，就连经验丰富、很有能力的监管部门也经常准备不足。如果从这个角度来分析中国银行间拆借市场近期出现的震荡，我们也许能更好地理解本次短期恐慌的成因，进而避免反应过度或过度解读。
Granted, the opacity of the decision-making process, the lack of a free press, and the insensitivity of policy-makers to the need to communicate their intentions to market participants all contribute to the difficulty in making the right call on China. To avoid making mistakes in the future, analysts should do themselves a favor by focusing more on political factors than on economics. In the case of the recent upheaval in China's financial system, the idea that the squeeze was deliberately engineered by the PBOC to crack down on the shadow banking system makes little political sense. Only the Politburo Standing Committee, the ruling Communist Party's most powerful body, could have made such a decision. But the Politburo would not likely authorize such a move at this delicate moment.
当然，决策过程不透明，媒体受到限制，决策者不在乎是否需要就自己的意图和市场参与者进行沟通，这都使得在中国做出正确选择成为一个难题。为避免今后犯错，分析师应当更关注政治因素而不是经济，这样做对他们有益。就中国金融体系这次的震荡而言，央行特意压缩信贷以整治影子银行的说法从政治角度来看几乎没有任何道理可言。只有中央政治局才有可能做出这样的决定。但在目前这样的微妙时刻，中央政治局不太可能授权采取这样的行动。
The Communist Party is scheduled to hold its third central committee plenum in the fall, when its most important economic initiatives will be unveiled. It is inconceivable that the party's leadership would risk economic turmoil and disrupt its plans with a bold move on the shadow banking system before they head to the beach for the summer.
中共中央第三次全体会议将在今年秋天召开，会上将宣布最重要的经济措施。中央领导人在夏季到来之前冒着影响经济并打乱自身部署的风险对影子银行采取大胆行动，这是件不能想象的事情。
To implement any kind of meaningful reform to the shadow banking system, Chinese leadership will first have to reach a consensus at the top, overcome resistance from interest groups, and devise complex plans to address the consequences of reform. All this takes time and fierce bargaining. Based on the quick retreat sounded by the PBOC, it is quite obvious that the top leadership has no such plans in place for now.
对影子银行进行实质性改革前，中国领导人首先需要在最高层达成共识，消除来自利益集团的阻力，并针对改革产生的影响制定完善的应对计划。所有这些都需要时间和激烈的讨价还价。考虑到中国人民银行接到了迅速撤退的命令，最高领导层目前显然还没有这样的计划。
However, this does not mean that Beijing can delay dealing with the massive risks in the banking system for very long. If anything, the recent bloodbath in the Chinese financial sector should prompt China's top leaders that they must have a more comprehensive plan for financial deleveraging when they meet in the fall. Otherwise, they are almost certain to face a bursting of China's credit bubble that will make last week's turmoil look insignificant.
不过，这并不意味着中国政府可以长期推迟化解银行系统中大量风险的工作。如果说最近中国金融业陷入困境有什么作用的话，那就是它应该让中国最高领导人意识到，今年秋天的三中全会上，他们必须就金融去杠杆化拿出更完善的方案。否则，他们几乎必然会看到中国信贷泡沫的破裂，与之相比，上周的情况就会显得微不足道。