One of the startling features of Anglo-American capitalism is that corporate investment remains so low when profits are so high.
英美资本主义当前的一个显著特征是在利润如此之高之际企业投资却保持低位。
This lack of investment seems all the more puzzling given that money is cheap, infrastructure needs are glaring, fast-growing consumer markets are opening up all over the developing world, and smart technologies are making it possible to imagine and create new business models.
鉴于资金低廉、基础设施需求显而易见、快速增长的消费市场正在发展中世界一个接一个涌现、智能科技让想象和创建新的商业模式成为可能，这种投资匮乏显得格外令人困惑。
What is going on?
怎么会这样？
The most obvious answer is that corporate bosses are still traumatised by the financial crash of 2008 and remain highly risk averse.
最显而易见的答案是公司老板在2008年金融危机期间受到的创伤仍未痊愈，避险情绪强烈。
It is easier to cling to what you have than to bet on something new.
相对于押注新的业务，守成是更容易的选择。
Just ask Eli Lilly, the US pharmaceutical company that spent billions of dollars developing an Alzheimer’s drug that has sadly failed its clinical trials.
问问美国制药公司礼来(Eli Lilly)吧，该公司曾斥资数十亿美元开发一种治疗阿尔茨海默病的药物，遗憾的是该药未能通过临床测试。
A more sophisticated argument runs that there is too little new technology to spark investment.
一种更有水平的观点认为，激发投资的新科技太少。
The great discoveries of the past 150 years, such as electricity, flight and the combustion engine, encouraged widespread investment as industries and infrastructures were built.
过去150年的伟大发现（例如电力、飞行和内燃机）鼓励了广泛投资，以打造新的产业和基础设施。
But all the low-hanging technological fruit has been eaten.
但这些易于摘取的技术成果都已被摘取。
Others, though, argue the exact opposite: the latest cornucopia of technologies, such as artificial intelligence and robotics, threatens to destroy many existing businesses and is deterring investment.
然而，还有一些人的观点恰恰相反：最新一代的科技（例如人工智能和机器人）对很多现有业务构成生存威胁，因而在阻碍投资。
A fatalism seems to have descended on many corporate boards: why invest when you have no idea whether an insurgent company will emerge from left field to eat your lunch?
很多公司董事会似乎已经听天由命：如果你不知道会不会有一家天不怕地不怕的公司突然出现抢走你的午餐，为什么要投资呢？
According to a survey by Fujitsu of almost 1,200 senior executives around the world, 52 per cent think their business will not exist in its current form in five years’ time.
根据富士通(Fujitsu)针对全球近1200名高管的一项调查，52%的受访者认为他们的业务在5年后将不会以现有形式存在。
Innovation is viewed as a young company’s game.
创新被视为年轻公司的游戏。
But there is mounting evidence to suggest that the investment drought has also been caused by excessive short-termism and misaligned financial incentives , as many economists have long argued.
然而，越来越多的证据似乎表明，就像许多经济学家一直辩称的那样，投资匮乏的原因也包括极度短视以及错位的金钱激励。
Why should a chief executive, whose median tenure is less than five years, invest for the long term when they can juice up profits by slashing costs?
对于一个任期中值不到5年的首席执行官，与其进行长线投资，何不通过削减成本提高利润？
In a forthcoming paper in the Review of Financial Economics, Alex Edmans of London Business School and Vivian Fang of Carlson School of Management present telling evidence showing how chief executives chop research spending just ahead of stock vesting deadlines to drive up the share price.
在《金融经济学评论》(Review of Financial Economics)即将发表的一篇论文中，伦敦商学院(LBS)的阿列克谢.埃德曼斯(Alex Edmans)和卡尔森商学院(Carlson School of Management)的维维安.方(Vivian Fang)提出了有力证据表明，首席执行官会在股票行权截止期限前削减研究支出，以推升股价。
Having studied the record of 1,758 US companies, they conclude that reductions in investment are myopic.
在研究过1758家美国公司的记录后，他们得出结论称，减少投资是短视行为。
Investment is not an end in itself and should not be made willy nilly, professor Edmans says.
埃德曼斯教授表示，投资本身并非目的，不应该以犹豫不决的心态作出。
After all, the function of stock markets is often to recycle money from mature, cash-rich companies into faster-growing start-ups.
毕竟，股市的功能往往是把资金从现金充裕的成熟公司导向增长更快的初创企业。
But shareholders could certainly push managers to explore more fruitful long-term investment by extending the duration of stock vesting periods from a standard three years to seven or more.
但股东肯定可以通过将股票行权期从一般的3年延长到7年或更长，来鼓励管理者探索更有成效的长期投资。
Rather than obsessing about absolute pay levels, shareholders should focus on the period over which incentives are paid.
股东不应纠结于绝对的薪资水平，而是应关注于支付激励的时间跨度。
It is not the quantum that matters but the horizon, Prof Edmans says.
埃德曼斯教授表示：重要的不是数字，而是时间长度。
There may also be a case, he says, for appointing younger CEOs who will live with the consequences of their investment decisions and care more about their reputations over the longer term.
他表示，任命较年轻首席执行官也可能是有理由的，他们将面对投资决定的后果，并更多地关注于自己的较长期声誉。
Some other economists, though, suggest that far more radical steps are needed to reap the full benefits of the latest technological innovations.
然而，还有一些经济学家提出，需要采取更加到位的措施来收获最新科技创新的所有成果。
Carlota Perez, a professor at the London School of Economics, argues that an effective way of spurring more investment would be to rewrite our completely wacky tax regimes, which penalise goods rather than bads.
伦敦政治经济学院(London School of Economics)教授卡洛塔.佩雷斯(Carlota Perez)认为，促进更多投资的有效方式是改革我们完全古怪的税收制度，目前它惩罚的是好行为而非坏行为。
Why do we tax salaries so heavily when we consider employment to be a good thing? Why not shift the burden to energy, materials and transport to stimulate the greening of the economy? Why not tilt the playing field towards longer-term investment by taxing short-term capital gains at punitive rates while cutting them for those made over five years?
如果我们认为就业是件好事的话，我们为什么要对薪资课以重税呢？为什么不把税务负担转移到能源、原材料和运输来刺激环保经济呢？为什么不通过对短期资本利得征收重税、同时降低5年期资本利得的税赋，让市场倾向于较长期投资呢？
Few governments are likely to be so bold, given how beholden they are to corporate lobbying.
鉴于政府受制于企业游说，几乎没有政府可能会这么大胆。
They appear way too susceptible to companies promising to invest more if only corporation tax was cut further and more research grants were forthcoming.
一些公司承诺只有在公司税赋进一步下调并获得更多研究补助时才会扩大投资，政府似乎太容易受到这些公司的影响了。
But the benefits of such corporate welfare are to be doubted.
但这些公司福利的好处应受到质疑。
Maybe it is time to turn recent logic on its head.
或许是时候颠覆近年的逻辑了。
If the private sector remains so reluctant to invest then governments should consider taxing companies more heavily and invest directly themselves.
如果私营部门仍不愿投资，那么政府应考虑对公司调高税赋，然后自己直接投资。